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Later stages of the product life-cycle are characterized by diminishing sales and declining prices. Especially firms with sub-
stantial product development costs, as is the case in the video game industry, are dependent on long product life-cycles to
amortize initial costs. This confronts firms with the fundamental challenge of maintaining the value of their product from the
consumer’s perspective and thus delaying the natural price decline. We investigate whether product features that facilitate
community involvement and interaction are an effective means to keep the product stimulating and relevant in the long run.
Using extensive data from the PC video game market, we show that the inclusion of interactive, community-engaging features
allows firms to both charge higher prices and delay the natural price decline of their product. However, for one of the investi-
gated features we find the opposite effect, which we explain by subsequent analysis. Thereby, we gain valuable insights into
the importance of robustly designed incentive systems in community-focused features. Our findings could help firms in their
efforts to design attractive and economically viable products with prolonged life-cycles.
Keywords: Product life-cycle; digital goods pricing; user communities; co-creation; digital gaming platforms.
1. Introduction
Every product is subject to a life-cycle (Levitt, 1965). This
applies to digital products just as much as to physical prod-
ucts. Although they do not age through wear and tear, they
fall victim to psychological obsolescence (Park, 2010). Later
stages of the product life-cycle are characterized by diminish-
ing sales and declining prices (Golder & Tellis, 2003). From
an economic point of view, a product’s life-cycle ends when it
no longer generates revenue. While progressive digitization
of content substantially reduced marginal cost, there are still
many digital products whose consumption is preceded by sig-
nificant fixed costs, be it apps, movies, music or video games
(Shy, 2001, p. 182). This constitutes the highly challenging
task for firms to ensure long life-cycles and thereby amortize
initial costs.
Extending the life-cycle translates into remaining rele-
vant from the customer’s perspective by offering continuous
high value, which in turn allows firms to delay the natu-
ral price decline of their product. While traditional qual-
ity features of a product, such as the graphic quality of a
video game, inevitably become obsolete with age, firms are
increasingly turning their attention to product features that
generate long-term stimulation and relevance. In the age
of connectedness, it is the interactive, community-involving
features that drive ongoing engagement (Von Hippel & Katz,
2002). In theory, such “Community Features” empower users
to interact, set their own impulses, exchange ideas and give
feedback. Thus, the community becomes a living “sound-
ing board” which keeps the product vibrant and dynamic in
the long run. Thereby, firms hope to maintain the value of
the product from the consumer’s perspective over the prod-
uct life-cycle, and to capture it through higher prices.
In this context we attempt to address the research ques-
tion of how Community Involvement influences price setting
of firms on digital platforms? We investigate this question
using the PC video game market as a relevant example, for
four reasons. First, from an economic standpoint, video gam-
ing has matured into a worldwide market worth 130B USD
with an annual growth rate of 5.8% over the last five years,
surpassing other two-sided markets such as music, cinema,
TV or radio (PwC, 2019). Further, it is predicted that within
the next five years consumers will spend an average of 25%
more time annually on video games, leaving the growth rates
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of any other digital platforms like music streaming and social
networking behind (Clarefield, 2018; PwC, 2017). Second,
from a practical standpoint, we argue that long life-cycles
are of particular relevance here. Unlike many other types
of digital content, consumption is preceded by years of ex-
pensive development. Bankruptcies of developers who were
unable to amortize their game during its lifespan are the per-
vasive reality (Leibovitz, 2013). Third, digital gaming plat-
forms share many characteristics of efficient markets, most
notably, many suppliers and consumers, low barriers to entry,
fairly rational consumers, intense competition, high trans-
parency and independent pricing by suppliers (see Chapter
3: Industry Background). This makes them an intriguing ob-
ject of investigation as a representative for other digital plat-
forms. Lastly, from a market dynamics standpoint, the video
game industry is currently undergoing an upheaval that chal-
lenges the previous understanding of the term “gaming plat-
form”. Previously, platforms in the video game context were
mostly understood as physical goods in the form of consoles,
which act as an interface between game developers and play-
ers. Recently, through digitization of content, advanced dig-
ital rights management systems and higher performance of
personal computers, we have witnessed the rise of “digital
gaming platforms”, allowing developers to publish PC games
cheaply and consumers to buy and play them directly on the
platform (Jöckel, Will, & Schwarzer, 2008). These new digi-
tal gaming platforms, which act as a central hub for millions
of players and thousands of developers, allow developers to
involve their community in entirely new ways. We are focus-
ing on the pioneering and largest platform “Steam”.
For this research we are investigating three novel meth-
ods that game developers can employ to promote player in-
teraction and involvement. Specifically, we look at three
Community Features that allow players to (1) customize a
game with own and peers’ User Generated Content, (2) col-
lect and trade virtual items and (3) complete game chal-
lenges and earn social status, respectively. We develop theory
to argue that the inclusion of these Community Features in
games allows developers to charge higher prices and delay
the natural price decline over the life-cycle of their game.
To test this empirically, we collected five years worth of
longitudinal data on pricing, game characteristics and player
numbers for over 2,000 games on Steam. For Community
Feature (1) and (3) we find that developers can both charge
higher prices and delay the natural price decline. For feature
(2) we find the opposite effect. We explain the unexpected
latter result with a subsequent analysis. We discover that the
feature was used in a different way than the platform Steam
intended and point out the importance of designing robust
incentive systems during the conception of Community Fea-
tures. We thereby contribute to the sparse empirical research
on the effects of Community Involvement on pricing in the
context of digital platforms.
The rest of this paper is structured as follows. Chapter
2 presents an overview of the related literature on pricing,
life-cycles and Community Involvement. Chapter 3 provides
a closer look of digital gaming platforms and Steam. Chapter
4 develops theory and hypotheses. Chapter 5 describes meth-
ods used for data collecting and analysis, ventures an ex-
ploratory descriptive analysis and features our models. Chap-
ter 6 presents results, while Chapter 7 discusses them and
shows limitations. Finally, Chapter 8 concludes with implica-
tions and directions for future research.
2. Related Literature
Our study touches on a number of key theoretical con-
cepts, mainly pricing, product life-cycle and Community In-
volvement in the context of digital platforms. We will give a
brief overview of how these topics relate in previous litera-
ture.
2.1. Pricing and Product Life-Cycle
Literature on pricing of new products is vast and cov-
ers various aspects. In this chapter we provide a selective
overview of pricing decisions over the life-cycle of a prod-
uct. Two prominent pricing policies in particular have been
much discussed in the literature: A strategy of high introduc-
tory prices that fall over time to skim off the demand, “price
skimming”, and the strategy of low initial prices to capture
the market, “penetration pricing” (Chatterjee, 2009; Dean,
1976). We will mainly focus on skimming strategies. Also
relevant is the abstract notion of product lifecycles. While
definitions are often fuzzy, it most commonly describes the
gaussian-like diffusion in form of sales of a product over time
along with declining prices (Levitt, 1965).
Early studies show the effects pricing can have on the dif-
fusion, i.e. sales, of a new product. Already Bass and Bultez
(1982) found, using theoretical diffusion models, that prices
should fall monotonously over time. Later, Krishnan, Bass,
and Jain (1999) specified that a monotonically falling price
is optimal, especially if the new product is confronted with a
price-sensitive target group or if the use of the new product
involves risk, e.g. lack of quality. This is in line with similar
studies using diffusion models (Bass, 1980; Dolan & Jeuland,
1981; Kalish, 1983). Unlike previously discussed studies that
assume monopolistic market situations, a more recent study
in the context of oligopolistic market structures suggests that
optimal prices drop to a lower level if the product is subject
to a shorter life-cycle, i.e. speed of diffusion is higher (Dock-
ner & Fruchter, 2004). The authors justify this by arguing
that producers try to gain larger market shares in the face of
a shortened product life through aggressive pricing.
These early studies have a few things in common: first,
the optimal price is solved analytically in a theoretical model,
second, the logic is not tested on real world data, and most
importantly third, demand is assumed to be exogenous (i.e.
given via diffusion mechanism) and undynamic (in terms of
strategic response to producer pricing). Motivated by these
deficits, Nair (2004) shows, based on data from the video
games market, that over the life of a product, producers are
confronted with consumers that have different willingness
to pay. Those who attach high value to the product buy it
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early, while those with a low willingness to pay wait. Ac-
cording to Nair, companies thus have an incentive to reduce
prices as the product ages to skim off individual willingness
to pay with so-called intertemporal price discrimination. In-
terestingly, he further shows that consumer behavior can be
rational and strategic by anticipating price reductions and
postponing the purchase decisions. Foundational literature
supports the notion of such heterogenous demand conditions
and attributes them to varying consumer preferences, which
translate into different anticipated utility and willingness to
pay (Roberts & Lilien, 1993; Varian, 1992). Rietveld and Eg-
gers (2018) show for the video game market that games en-
counter a heterogeneous audience over their life-cycle, start-
ing with early adopters who are willing to experiment and
have significantly higher willingness-to-pay and late adopters
who are more risk-averse.
However, while all these studies recognize and model that
consumers are heterogenous, they also base their analyses
on the questionable assumption that perceived utility of a
product is constant over time for each individual (Adner &
Levinthal, 2001). Although preferences can be considered
mostly static, products are not “fixed”, Adner and Levinthal
point out. Utility and therefore willingness to pay can be
increased over time by continuously introducing more qual-
ity to the product (Adner & Levinthal, 2001). Unlike most
other studies they deviate from the simplifying assumption
of monopolistic market situations and show that constant
“rejuvenation” is especially effective with increasing compe-
tition. Similarly, Weerahandi and Dalal (1992) adapt the
usual diffusion models to include the effect of increased util-
ity through product attributes on purchase decisions. In con-
trast to most aforementioned research, a more recent study
deviates from the assumption of exogenous demand (i.e. dif-
fusion mechanism), by forecasting sales of a product purely
based on increased product utility over time (Fruchter & Or-
bach, 2008). They even go a step further as they also consider
characteristics that constitute positive network externalities.
Their findings suggest that prices can be held up if product
characteristics are improved.
The previously discussed literature argues that continu-
ally falling prices are the optimal pricing policy. This is also
observable in studies of the video game market (Liu, 2010;
Nair, 2004) and in our video game data, too. However, we
would like to briefly mention that penetration pricing, i.e.
initially aggressive prices, can be observed in other contexts.
For example, in the platform battle between Playstation and
Nintendo, Liu (2010) shows that initial penetration pricing
can foster essential indirect network effects between console
and game developers in order to win the market.
From the previously considered studies, some overarch-
ing insights can be deduced: First, over the lifespan of a prod-
uct, the optimal prices fall. Second, much of the price re-
search looks at the impact of pricing (independent variable)
on sales (dependent variable). Thus, price is usefully seen
as a strategic marketing tool. In the following, we want to
reverse the role of price and consider it as a measure of value
for a product that should be maximized over the life-cycle.
Third, there is little research on how the inclusion of value-
generating product features can increase the willingness to
pay over time and allow higher prices.
2.2. Community Involvement as Utility Dimension
There is diverse literature that investigates the influence
of product characteristics on consumer utility and willing-
ness to pay. For example, previous studies have investigated
changes in utility and willingness to pay for changes in prod-
uct characteristics for digital goods such as music downloads
(Hahsler & Breidert, 2006), smartphones (Böhm, Adam,
& Farrell, 2015), mobile service platforms (Nikou & et al.,
2014), online banking services (Yusuf Dauda & Lee, 2015)
and tablet news apps (Gundlach & Hofmann, 2017).
However, in this study we are interested in the effect
of Community Features. We define Community Features as
product features that involve the community and enable in-
teractions between platform participants. They are particu-
larly relevant in the context of platforms as they are used in
interaction with other users and can hence exhibit consider-
able network utility, more discussed in Chapter 4: Theory and
Hypotheses (Katz & Shapiro, 1985; Meyer, 2012). Nonethe-
less, we find that the influence of Community Features on
utility is very rarely measured. As one of few, a study by Ben-
lian, Vetter, and Hess (2010) shows that Community Features
(e.g. playlist sharing) in music streaming have a positive ef-
fect on the willingness to pay, but less so than classic quality
features (e.g. sound quality). A comparable study for on-
line games shows that willingsness to pay is higher for Com-
munity Features (e.g. virtual chat rooms) and customization
features (e.g. character creation) than for better quality fea-
tures (e.g. graphic quality). This indicates that Community
Involvement is valued differently depending on the product.
Yet, both analyses only provide a static view on the value of
these features. Two very recent studies on the video game
market adopt a more dynamic view by showing that Com-
munity Features can have a lasting effect on the life-cycle of
a product. First, a study of the video game market found that
games with multiplayer functionality generate higher sales in
later phases of the life-cycle (Marchand, 2016). Second, Ri-
etveld and Eggers (2018) show for Free-To-Play Games on
Steam that games with Community Features (online multi-
player) are much more likely to become a “killer app”, mea-
sured by download numbers.
While multiplayer functionality in video games is a well-
established way of letting individuals interact with each other
and benefit from direct network effects, there are many other
ways to involve the community that haven’t been subject to
much prior empirical research.
3. Industry Background
Traditionally, video gaming platforms have mainly been
understood as physical goods in the form of consoles, which
act as an interface between game developers and players.
Thus, the video game market can be classified as a two-sided
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market, which facilitates interaction between complemen-
tors, i.e. producers of complementary products (game de-
velopers), and consumers (players) (Eisenmann, Parker, &
Van Alstyne, 2006). The video game market is characterized
by a number of features, most notably: indirect network
effects, which suggest that the utility obtained by platform
participants on one side depends on the number of com-
plementary platform participants on the other side (Katz &
Shapiro, 1985). Equally important are direct network ef-
fects, which state that the utility also depends on the number
of participants on the same platform side (Shy, 2011). In
addition, the traditional video game market is characterized
by intense hardware standards battles (Gallagher & Park,
2002), varying inter-generational hardware compatibility
(Claussen, Kretschmer, & Spengler, 2010), short and inter-
dependent hardware and software life-cycles (Marchand,
2016), the phenomenon of multi-homing between platforms
(Landsman, V. and Stremersch, S., 2011), heterogeneous
consumer needs (Rietveld & Eggers, 2018) and the presence
of high switching costs (Gallagher & Park, 2002).
However, the video games industry is currently under-
going a transformation that challenges the traditional un-
derstanding of the term “games platform”. With the digi-
talization of content, advanced Digital Rights Management
systems and increased performance of computers, a new in-
termediary has entered the market: so-called “Digital Game
Distribution Platforms” allow developers to offer PC games
at low cost and players to buy and play games directly on the
platform (Jöckel et al., 2008). The pioneer and largest rep-
resentative of such digital gaming platforms is Steam, with
40,000 games and 20M active players at peak times (Steam-
spy, 2020).
While these digital gaming platforms introduce many
novelties, the central mechanics of the traditional gaming
industry, such as network effects and game lifecycles, are
preserved. Still, some rules are changing. First, there is
hardly any dependency between hardware generations and
games anymore, since the compatibility of PC games is not
dependent on a specific hardware generation, as was usually
the case with consoles (Marchand, 2016). This means that
the life-cycle of games is not predefined by the life-cycle of
hardware. Second, there are low barriers to entry, which
gave rise to the genre of “indie” games (Lin, Bezemer, & Has-
san, 2018). Small and semi-professional developers (“indie
developers”) are able to publish their game for a one-time
payment of 100€ and get exposure to an audience of mil-
lions, whereas before only big software companies could
afford development and were exploited by platform owners
as the “money-making side” (Bowen Martin & Deuze, 2009;
Steam, 2020d). Third, digital platforms are characterized by
increased transparency, as prices and independent ratings are
directly comparable, which was previously less feasible with
analogue games. Fourth, Nair (2004) has already shown
for the traditional video game industry that consumers can
act rationally and strategically by anticipating price reduc-
tions and postponing purchases. It is likely that such rational
consumer behavior increases in the face of greater market
transparency on digital gaming platforms.
Given these attributes, digital gaming platforms share
many characteristics of efficient markets; most notably, many
suppliers and consumers, fairly rational consumers, low bar-
riers to entry, intense competition, high transparency and in-
dependent pricing by suppliers (Bork, 1993). This makes
Steam an intriguing object of investigation as a representa-
tive for other digital platforms.
Finally, these new digital gaming platforms, which act as
a central hub for millions of players and thousands of de-
velopers, enable entirely new possibilities for interaction and
Community Involvement. For example, in recent years Steam
has developed a range of value-added services that game de-
velopers have been able to integrate voluntarily through a
Software Development Kit. These features have been tar-
geted at further involving players, or as Steam puts it in their
developer documentation, “to increase engagement, encour-
age player interaction and motivate players to spend more of
their time in-game” (Steam, 2020c). This is a prime example
of a platform owner, aspiring to empower its complementors
with powerful tools to sustain long-term utility of their con-
tent.
4. Theory and Hypotheses
In this study we investigate the influence of Community
Involvement on the price-setting of companies. In the con-
text of the PC video game industry, we look at three impor-
tant ways in which developers let their players get involved
and interact with each other. In the following, we take a
closer look at these three ways and derive testable hypothe-
ses. “Community Feature” is not an established term and is
rarely used in the literature. For our study, we broadly define
those product features as Community Features that engage
users by enabling interactions between platform members.
Platform members are both users and game developers.
4.1. Contributing User Generated Content: “Steam Work-
shop”
Giving users the opportunity to participate in product
development, create complementary products, and modify
existing products is not a new phenomenon. Chesbrough
(2003) coined the term “open innovation” to describe how
companies can better meet the needs of their target group
by complementing their own innovation efforts with external
user innovation. According to Urban and Von Hippel (1988),
so-called lead users, i.e. users who feel the needs of the target
group much earlier than the rest of the market, are of particu-
lar importance. Their contributions to the innovation process
are considered more relevant and novel by other users (Lilien
& et al., 2001; Schreier, 2007; Von Hippel, 1986).
User innovation has a long tradition in the video game
market. Games have long sought to differentiate themselves
in the face of intense competition and to maximize cus-
tomer satisfaction by giving them a say in company decisions
(Jeppesen, 2005; Koch & Bierbamer, 2016). For example,
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the success of bestseller “The Sims” is often explained by
the richness of User Generated Content (e.g. game charac-
ters), which is estimated to account for up to 90%. (CERI,
2006; Banks, 2013). A case study of the game “Trackmania”
concludes that the game’s unusually long life span can be
explained by the fact that the developers allow users to con-
tinually expand the game, which has led to a self-sustaining
ecosystem of over 100 community websites and 3 million ac-
tive hobby developers (Koch & Bierbamer, 2016; Parmentier
& Gandia, 2013).
Since 2011, Steam offers a marketplace called Workshop.
Developers can offer a Workshop for their game, allowing
users to create, share and integrate content such as char-
acters, game items and levels. Currently, there are about
4,000 games using this functionality, compared to 200 in
2016. In addition, developers provide user toolkits, i.e. tools
and guidelines that allow users to create new products, com-
plementary products or modify existing ones (Von Hippel &
Katz, 2002). In the context of Steam, developers provide
their users with so-called Software Development Kits, a col-
lection of game-specific developer tools that allow players
to create compatible content for the game at hand. A posi-
tive side effect of Workshop is that the developer facilitates
a community that acts like a living “sounding board”. It al-
lows players to share best practices, allows mutual help and
learning, which increases the value of the game (Humphreys,
2005; Jeppesen, 2005). It also creates bilateral communi-
cation and feedback mechanisms between developer and
player.
Jeppesen (2004) argues that the value-added through the
availability of User Generated Content is twofold. First, the
game becomes more attractive through the fact that com-
plementary, often free content is available. The many pos-
sibilities for “mix and match”, according to Jeppesen, keep
the game young in the long term, which has a positive ef-
fect on sales, especially in later phases of life. Second, and
less intuitively, the author shows that developers systemat-
ically integrate popular User Generated Content into their
game. This suggests that such games continuously increase
their value from the user’s perspective and are less likely to
be out of touch with the needs of the target group. We found
proof of this phenomenon in Steam’s Subscription Agree-
ment: “In some cases, Workshop Contributions may be con-
sidered for incorporation by Valve or a third-party developer
into a game” (Steam, 2020b).
Nevertheless, an extensive case-study, which conducted
interviews with game industry executives and experts, re-
veals that the share of innovating players is low, whereas the
vast majority are not willing “to improve or modify or ex-
change with others” (Burger-Helmchen & Cohendet, 2011).
Further, interviews with these regular players indicate that
content from others is occasionally integrated and may lead
to higher satisfaction and loyalty. However, previous research
has shown that the quality of User Generated Content varies
greatly (Lastowka, 2007). Thus, it is possible that users have
bad experiences due to bugs, incompatibility, malware or of-
fensive content (e.g. pornography), which negatively rubs
off on the value of the underlying game. Steam counteracts
this with rating systems, Steam moderators and the possibil-
ity for developers to curate contributions beforehand. How-
ever, it is unclear how many developers use this, given the
effort involved.
When studying the motivation behind User Generated
Content, we must distinguish between extrinsic and intrin-
sic factors. Extrinsic motivators include monetary incentives.
For example, Steam lets users charge money for their cre-
ations to “allow mod [modification] makers the opportunity
to work on their mods full time” (Steam Blog, 2015, 2020).
This encountered great resistance from players, as user con-
tent has traditionally been free, which is why nowadays only
a fraction of all content has to be paid for. According to
Lerner and Triole (2002), building a reputation within the
community is more important for users. In some cases, hobby
developers even manage to break into developer jobs (Cadin,
Guérin, & Defillippi, 2006; Poor, 2014). Nevertheless, intrin-
sic motivators seem to be the main driver for user innovation.
A recent study, which conducted a survey of user innovators,
identified joy, learning new skills and cognitive challenges
as key (Koch & Kerschbaum, 2014). Franke and Von Hippel
(2002) also point out the heterogeneity of user needs that
cannot be met by standard software products. Users must
therefore accept products that do not fit them well, which re-
duces their perceived value of the game. By offering toolkits,
users get a voice and can tailor the product to their needs,
whereby lead users benefit directly as they bring the neces-
sary skills and resources, and other users indirectly by using
the shared content (Franke & Von Hippel, 2002; Koch & Bier-
bamer, 2016).
Koch and Bierbamer (2016) are able to show for a small
sample of games that the ability to create User Generated
Content has a positive influence on the rating of a game. We
investigate whether this higher satisfaction can be exploited
with higher prices and therefore formulate the hypotheses:
H1a Enabling players to create own game content
and enjoy their peers’ content via Workshop allows
developers to charge higher prices.
H1b Enabling players to create own game content
and enjoy their peers’ content via Workshop allows
developers to delay the price decline of their game.
We know that the full effect of User Generated Content is
achieved when it not only helps one individual to customize
their game, but is also available to all others, whereby ev-
eryone benefits in form of network utility (Katz & Shapiro,
1985). It can therefore be assumed that a larger community
will benefit more from the possibility of creating User Gener-
ated Content. We therefore formulate:
H1c A larger player community allows develop-
ers to charge higher prices for enabling players to
create and share content.
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4.2. Collecting and Trading Virtual Items: “Steam Trading-
cards”
Virtual items that players can earn, collect and trade have
become an integral part of online games. They can take many
different forms, such as in-game items, trophies or trading
cards, and can entail diverse functionalities, benefits and val-
ues. Since 2013, Steam has been offering developers the
opportunity to create game-specific Tradingcards. Some of
the cards are given to players at random intervals during the
game, while the remaining cards must be acquired by trad-
ing with other players on Steam (or buying them with vir-
tual Steam money) to get a complete set. This set can then
be displayed on the profile or exchanged for tradable bene-
fits such as badges, personalized Steam profile backgrounds
and game coupons (Steam, 2020a). About 9,000 games offer
Tradingcards, which is about 20% of all games (Steam Card
Exchange, 2020).
A large number of studies have examined the psycholog-
ical stimuli triggered by virtual goods as well as the needs
these goods satisfy. Bostan (2009) argues that players sat-
isfy materialistic needs by possessing virtual goods, just as
they do in the physical world. Some players spend substan-
tial amounts of time amassing items to show them off, com-
pare and trade them (Guo & Barnes, 2007; Yee, 2006). Such
collectors often feel a strong desire for completeness (Danet
& Katriel, 1994). Steam takes advantage of this by requiring
players to have a full set of cards to reap the full benefits.
This “un-locking mechanism” evokes anticipation and player
interest in the long-term (Hallford & Lamothe, 2001; Wang &
Sun, 2011). It is also conceivable that less mainstream games
will become disproportionately more attractive through Trad-
ingcards. For collectors, their cards are particularly valuable
due to their rarity (Hamari & Lehdonvirta, 2010).
Formanek (1994) argues that collectibles also have a sen-
timental value as they remind of successful gaming experi-
ences. In the case of Steam, Tradingcards can be a personal
expression allowing a player to publicly identify with a game,
signal one’s interests and be part of a certain gaming commu-
nity (Wang & Sun, 2011).
In the case of Steam, the incentives go beyond the mere
possession of items. Players can use their cards to customize
profile backgrounds, generate badges, and use rare emoti-
cons while chatting, thereby “cosmetically” differentiating
themselves. While this satisfies intrinsic needs for customiza-
tion (Guo & Barnes, 2007), it also creates a “visual authority”
over others, which many players appreciate, according to a
survey of 300 players (Park & Lee, 2011).
Getting a full deck of cards is only possible by trading
with others. Thereby, Steam adds a social dimension to a
game. Given that social interaction is one of the most im-
portant gratifications of gaming, a positive influence on the
value of a game can be expected, especially for single-player
games (Scharkow, 2015). However, it is possible that re-
wards for activities outside the game, i.e. trading, or through
mere playing time are perceived as unfair. Steam counter-
acts this by offering rewards that are only “cosmetic” and not
functional, thereby persevering performance-oriented game
mechanics.
Offering rewards at random times during the game has
a gambling character, which makes such games exciting and
addictive (Wang & Sun, 2011). Steam takes advantage of
this logic by distributing cards at unknown times. However,
in extreme cases, according to Rozin (2000), this can have
negative effects on the gaming experience if the time of the
reward is not predictable at all.
Virtual items can also be extrinsically motivating. Cas-
tronova (2005, p. 19) exemplifies the value virtual assets
can have by showing that the multiplayer game Everquest is
amongst the 80 largest economies in the world and its cur-
rency is more valuable than the Yen. Whang and Kim (2005)
use a survey of nearly 5,000 players to show that some play-
ers see collectibles as a pure investment with value apprecia-
tion. Rare cards on Steam also embody enormous monetary
value. They can be exchanged for virtual money on Steam,
exchanged for real money on eBay or an enormous ecosys-
tem at dedicated websites (e.g. steamcardexchange.net), as
well as converted into expensive games.
Based on intrinsic and extrinsic motivators, we formulate
the following hypotheses:
H2a Enabling players to collect and trade virtual
items in form of Tradingcards allows developers to
charge higher prices.
H2b Enabling players to collect and trade virtual
items in form of Tradingcards allows developers to
delay the price decline of their game.
4.3. Mastering Challenges and Earning Status: “Steam
Achievements”
There is a wide variety of reward-based systems that tar-
get intrinsic and extrinsic motivations to motivate individ-
uals towards high performance, commitment and achieve-
ment of goals (Farzan & et al., 2008). The influence of re-
wards such as virtual badges, points or rankings has pre-
viously been investigated by empirical studies for a variety
of areas, for example enterprise social networks (Farzan &
et al., 2008; Thom, Millen, & DiMicco, 2012), collaborative
ideation tools (Jung, Schneider, & Valacich, 2010), e-learning
tools (Denny, 2013), peer lending platforms (Hamari, 2013)
and image tagging platforms (Mekler, Brühlmann, Opwis, &
Tuch, 2013).
The games industry is considered the origin of such
reward systems, hence the term “gamification” (Hamari,
2013). Since 2007, games on Steam have been able to re-
ward players for particular accomplishments in the game
with so-called Achievements. Developers define challenges
of different difficulty, some of which are closely interwoven
with the story, and some of which are mundane tasks. Upon
completion, players will receive Achievements, essentially
badges, which will be displayed on their Steam profile.
Based on a survey of 3,000 players, Yee (2006) identifies
the feeling of achievement, which is expressed in advance-
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ment and competition, as one of the most important motiva-
tional factors in video games.
Literature suggests that rewards, such as Achievements,
create value for players by setting clear goals (Farzan & et al.,
2008; Hamari, 2013). This is in line with goal-setting theory,
according to which individuals are motivated to high perfor-
mance by challenging, short-term, measurable and specific
goals (Locke & Latham, 1991, 2002). In addition, meaning-
ful contextual challenges that teach players the possibilities
of a game can bring considerable pleasure. Thus, Achieve-
ments are to be understood as a “guiding instrument” that
helps the player to progress in the game (Hamari & Eranti,
2011; Montola, Nummenmaa, Lucero, Boberg, & Korhonen,
2009). Ideally, Achievements allow players to become com-
pletely immersed in the game and reach a mental “flow” state
(Csikszentmihalyi, 1990; Wang & Sun, 2011).
Steam grants Achievements immediately after completing
a task. According to Hamari (2013), the immediacy of posi-
tive feedback generates strong satisfaction and confirmation.
This in turn has a positive influence on the perception of
one’s own competence, which can lead to intrinsic motivation
(Mekler et al., 2013). More fundamental support for this is
provided by reinforcement theory, which states that regular
positive feedback strengthens the existing behavior (Luthans
& Stajkovic, 1999). However, poorly designed achievement
systems can cause frustration, for example, when Achieve-
ments are either too easy or too difficult to achieve (Juul,
2010), are used inflationarily or can be obtained through
mundane tasks. In the case of Steam, where developers can
define up to 500 Achievements per game, the quality and
meaningfulness might suffer.
Nonetheless, Achievements are not an end in themselves.
A large part of their value for individuals comes from the fact
that they are publicly displayed. Thus, citetMekler2013 con-
cluded based on a controlled experiment of letting people tag
images that participants are motivated by comparability and
display of performance. Similarly, Farzan and et al. (2008)
demonstrates that individuals show more activity on an en-
terprise social network as a result of public status and points.
These studies show that individuals in different contexts de-
rive social value from features that allow comparison. This
fulfills two needs central to gaming: “accumulating in-game
symbols of wealth or status” and “the desire to challenge and
compete with others”, as Yee (2006) puts it. Barnett and
Coulson (2010) note very practically that building a positive
reputation and signaling competence is essential for being
accepted into teams. Moreover, just as with virtual games-
items, there are also systematic “Achievement Completists”
who play a game until they have collected them all (Jakob-
sson, 2011, 2016). On Steam we find numerous groups like
“100% Achievements Group” with thousands of members.
Finally, Hamari and Koivisto (2013) show in the context
of a fitness social network that gamification features such as
Achievements generate positive attitudes towards the product
through increased reputation. This in turn leads to a higher
probability of further use and significantly higher recommen-
dation rates. Thus, Achievements can also be seen as an ef-
fective marketing instrument that increases the anticipated
value of a game.
Based on previous theory, we formulate the following hy-
potheses:
H3a Enabling players to master game challenges
and earn social status via Achievements allows de-
velopers to charge higher prices.
H3b Enabling players to master game challenges
and earn social status via
Achievements allows developers to delay the price




The data set for this study combines data from four dif-
ferent sources. Collecting data from different sources was
necessary to build a comprehensive and, in terms of the re-
search question, meaningful data set. As a first step, we iden-
tified the most popular game titles on Steam. We defined
games as “popular” if they had at least 1,000 active players
at any time since their release. This resulted in a list of 4,180
games. The reason for such a strict cut-off was the lack of
data quality and availability for less popular games. Next,
we obtained historical prices in USD for these games from
the website “steamdb.info”, which tracks prices for a vari-
ety of Steam games since November 2014. For this, we built
a custom crawler with Python, which retrieved the price his-
tory for each game in our list. The purpose of the crawler was
to automate an otherwise extremely time-consuming manual
task, but we paid attention to slow website calls to stay well
below the server’s rate limit. Unsuccessful website requests,
e.g. server errors, were logged and the call was repeated at
a later time. The collection process took about 3.5 weeks.
Ultimately, we were able to collect price histories for 3,801
games. 379 of these 3,801 games had incomplete histories
because they were released before Steamdb started tracking
prices, so we deleted them, resulting in a relevant sample
of 2,784 games (see Figure 1). Another important part of
the data set are the characteristics of games. Some of these
characteristics were directly available via Steam’s public de-
veloper API “api.steampowered.com”, which we queried with
a dedicated Python script. The other part of the game char-
acteristics were obtained in a similar way from the website
“steamspy.com”, which crawls the Steam website at regular
intervals. Finally, we retrieved historical player numbers for
each game from the website “steamcharts.com”, which docu-
ments these on a monthly basis for many Steam games since
2012.
5.1.2. Data Preparation
When obtaining the data, we made sure that all sources
use official Steam Game IDs, which allowed us to easily
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Figure 1: Distribution of Release Dates
merge the data into one large data set. From here, we iden-
tified a number of relevant cases that need to be treated
differently (see Figure 2). Most importantly, we need to
exclude games that have always been “free-to-play” from
our sample, since a price of 0 does not reflect the value of
the game, but rather indicates an alternative monetization
strategy, for example via In-App-Purchases. For games that
become free over time, we also assume a change in the mon-
etization strategy and trim them from that point on. Games
that retire at some point are continued with a price of 0 in
the original sources, which is why we also trim them.
Game profiles on Steam are filled out manually by devel-
opers. As a result, they may fill in incomplete information
when the game is released. For example, they may forget to
indicate what genre the game belongs to or whether it has
multiplayer functionality. Here, we use the swarm intelli-
gence of the player base. Players can create “Tags” for each
game that need to be upvoted by enough other players to ap-
pear on the profile. To increase the accuracy of variables, we
linked user-defined tags to profile information.
Finally, we constructed three sub-datasets. This is neces-
sary to answer different parts of the research question. Two
are of cross-sectional structure, one of which looks at the time
of release of the games, while the other compares all games at
the same time-point in the present (March 2020). The third
data set is panel structure and compares games over time.
5.2. Descriptive Evidence
Table 1 shows a condensed overview of the central
variables across the three datasets. As we built three sub-
datasets, we calculated three tables with summary statistics.
Due to space restrictions, these tables can be found in the
Appendix (see Table A1 for cross-sectional dataset “Release”,
Table A2 for cross-sectional dataset “Present”, Table A3 for
panel dataset).
Additionally, we take a first exploratory look at our data.
Since game prices are of particular importance in our context,
we will first look at the 16 (limited due to space) oldest games
in our sample (see Figure 3).
While the limited number of games depicted does of
course not represent all other games, we can nevertheless
venture five important deductions: First, we see that in most
cases the price declines over the years, which confirms that
games are subject to a life-cycle. Second, we acknowledge
that the rate of price decline varies greatly, some of them
remaining very stable. Third, we see that price reduction
is managed through sustained changes in the base price,
not through discounts (represented by strong downward
swings). Accordingly, the base price is a better, less volatile
measure of value for a game. Fourth, we can see that games
have fundamentally different price levels, e.g. some never
go below $30, while others never go above $10.
Since Community Involvement is of particular impor-
tance, we also look at four features that game developers
can use for this purpose. For sake of completeness, we show
Leaderboards here, although we will limit our focus to the
other three, as only they represent truly new approaches
to Community Involvement. It turns out that developers
integrate these features with varying frequency.
Next, we are interested to see if we can observe some in-
dication that games with above features have different price
patterns. For this purpose, we create two groups for each of
the features (with and without feature) and calculate aver-
age prices for all games in the respective group for each day
after release.
In fact, we can see big differences between the subgroups
of each Community Feature. First, we see that the subgroups
have different price levels across all features. Second, we can
see that there also seem to be different price developments.
Third, the feature Tradingcards is the only feature that per-
forms worse than it’s reference group.
The graphs should be interpreted with caution. The first
impression could be misleading, as there are unobserved cor-
relations and time effects, which we do not control at this
point. However, we take this as an opportunity to take a
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Figure 2: Categorization of noteworthy Cases
Table 1: Overview of Variables
Variable Definition
Price Price of a game (log)
Workshop User Generated Content: Players can create game content & use others’
Tradingcards Virtual items: Players can collect earn awards & display on profile
Achievements Challenges and Status: Players can earn awards & display on profile
Leaderboards Players can compare performance in rankings
Multiplayers Game supports multiplayer
Controller Support Game supports controllers
Cloud Gaming Game has various cloud functionalities
TV Compatible Game is playable on TV-Screen
Remote Gaming Game is playable privately remotely with friends
In-app-purchase Game offers players to buy game items
Number Languages Number of available languages in game
Number Pictures Number of pictures on store page to promote game
Number Trailers Number of trailers on store page to promote game
Developer Experience Number of games (Co-) developed so far
Publisher Experience Number of games (Co-) published so far
Number Markets Number of regions game is available
Platform Owner Platform owner Valve developed the game
Genre Game belongs to Action/Indie/Strategy/Simulation/Roleplay/
Casual/Nudity/Sport
Release Month Release month of Games
Operating System Game available on Windows/Mac/Linux or Combinations
User Rating User rating for game
Number ratings Number of total ratings for game
Average Playtime Average individual playtime for a game to date
Number of DLC Number of additional paid content available for game
Age Age in days of game
Players Number Average number of players for game over time(log)
Note: See Appendix Table A1, Table A2, Table A3 for more details & summary statistics
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Figure 3: Price Development of earliest Games in Sample
Figure 4: Proportion of Games with respective Community Feature
Figure 5: 3-year Price Development differentiated by Community Feature
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closer look at the effect of Community Features on the life-
cycle of a game.
5.3. Variables
5.3.1. Dependent Variables
The price of a game serves as a dependent variable across
our analysis. Depending on the model, we either look at the
price at a certain point in time, i.e. at release or present, or
the price over time. Since price shows a right-skewed dis-
tribution (see Figure 6), we log-transform the price as rec-
ommended in literature (Osborne, 2010). In doing so, we
strengthen the normal distribution of our Residuals (see Ap-
pendix Figure A1).
5.3.2. Independent Variables
The three Community Features, Workshop, Tradingcards,
Achievements serve as independent variables in this study and
are jointly included as Dummies. Since these three features
are either implemented in a game or not, we investigate the
effect of their existence on the Dependent Variable. Depend-
ing on the model, the variables are either included individu-
ally, i.e. additively, or each of them is included in interaction
with a another variable, i.e. multiplicatively.
5.3.3. Control Variables
The controls we apply depend on the model. In our cross-
sectional models, we employ controls to explain heterogene-
ity between games. Thus, we include a broad range of game
characteristics that could have an impact on the quality, i.e.
utility, perceived by the consumer (see Appendix Table A1
for a complete list). We also control for less tangible differ-
ences, such as increasing experience of developers and pub-
lishers over time, which could affect quality and promotion
of a given game. Since we are interested in price as a value
measure for game, we also control for supplementary mon-
etization strategies such as In-App-Purchases, which might
lead to a reduced price. In our panel models, we control for
differences in games by including Fixed Effects, which ac-
count for all time-invariant characteristics. In addition, we
control temporal factors in all models by including game age
or a Dummy for each month, which accounts for both vari-
ance due to time trends and shocks. The latter is particularly
important because part of our observations coincide with the
outbreak of Covid-19.
5.4. Model Specification
In total, we specified four models. The first two models
test H1a, H2a, H3a. We use OLS Models to exploit our data
at two distinct points in time. Model 1 looks at the time of
release of each game, hence we control Release Month.
PriceiRelease = β0 + β1Workshopi + β2Tradingcards
+ β3Achievementsi + β4DeveloperEx periencei
+ β5PublisherEx periencei
+ β6Plat f ormowner i + β7NumberTrailersi
+ βδNumberPic turesi + β9NumberMarketsi
+ β10FeatureVector i + β11GenreVector i
+ β12Operatings ystemVector i
+ β13ReleaseMonthVector i + εi
where i denotes a specific game; FeatureVectori ,
GenreVectori , OperatingS ystemVectori , ReleaseMonth
Vectori are vectors of characteristics of a game (see foot-
notes1234); εi represents the residuals; Workshopi ,
Tradingcardsi , Achievementsi are the independent Dummy
variables, coded 1 if the feature exists in game and 0 other-
wise.
Model 2 compares all games at the present time (March
2020), which is why we control the Age (non-linear, see Ap-
pendix Figure A2) to account for different lifecycle stages.
Further, we include additional variables that become rele-
vant at a later point in game life: User Rating, Number of
Reviews, Average Playtime, Number of DLC.
Pricei,Present = β0 + β1Workshopi + β2Tradingcardsi
+ β3Achievementsi + β4DeveloperEx periencei
+ β5PublisherEx periencei + β6Plat f ormOwneri
+ β7NumberTrailersi + β8NumberPic turesi
+ β9NumberMarketsi + β10UserRatingi
+ β12NumberReviewsi + β12AveragePla y t imei
+ β13NumberDLCi + β14GameAgei
+ β15(Agei ∗ Agei) + β16FeatureVectori
+ β17GenreVectori
+ β18OperatingS ystemVectori + εi
where i denotes a specific game; FeatureVectori ,
GenreVectori , OperatingS ystemVectori are vectors of
characteristics of a game (same as Model 1); εi represents
the residuals; Workshopi , Tradingcardsi , Achievementsi
are the independent Dummy variables, coded 1 if the fea-
ture exists in game and 0 otherwise. Both models use
more conservative Robust Standard Errors to cater for slight
heteroskedasticity, which a Breusch-Pagan test revealed
1Vector Features of game: Leaderboards, Multiplayer, Controller Sup-
port, Cloud Gaming, Virtual Reality, TV Compatible, Remote Gaming, In-
App-Purchases, Number Languages
2Vector Genres of game: Action, Indie, Strategy, Simulation, Roleplay,
Casual, Nudity, Sport, Racing
3Vector Operating Systems of game: Windows, Windows&Linux,
Windows&Mac, Windows&Mac&Linux
4Vector Release Month of games: Month Dummies for period November
2014 – March 2020
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Figure 6: Distribution of Price at significant Time Points
(Breusch & Pagan, 1979). Further we calculated Variance
Inflation Factors (VIFs) for our variables to ensure a lack
of multicollinearity (see Appendix Table A4, Table A5). All
factors are well below the commonly applied practice rule
of 10 (Chatterjee & Hadi, 1986). While we do employ many
variables, our variable-to-observation ratio is with 2,000 ob-
servations well below the most conservative ratio Tabachnick
and Fidell (2007, p. 123) suggest.
Model 3 test H1b, H2b, H3b. Via a Hausman-Test, we
tested the assumptions of applying a Panel OLS Random
Effects Regression (i.e. individual game effects are uncorre-
lated with regressors), which allows time-invariant variables
to be used in a regression (Hausman, 1978). As we couldn’t
reject the test-hypothesis of randomly distributed individual
effects, we employ a Panel OLS Regression with Fixed Effects
for games. Model 3 interacts Age of a game with each of the
Community Features Workshop, Tradingcards, Achievements,
which are time-invariant. Thereby, we examine whether
games with these features are subject to different price de-
velopment over Age. Further, we assume a different effect of
Player Numbers depending on Age.
Pricei,t = β0 + β1(Workshopi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β2(Tradingcardsi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β3(Achievementsi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β4(Pla yerNumbersi,t ∗ Agei,t)
+ β5Agei,t + β6Pla yerNumbersi,t + ui + εi,t
where i denotes a specific game, t a specific day, ui the
individual (fixed) effect of a game, and εi,t the residuals.
Model 4 tests H1c. Here, we interact Workshop with
Player Numbers to examine whether the effect of Workshop
on price changes with more players or equivalently phrased,
whether the effect of Player Numbers on price changes, given
the existence of Workshop in a game.
Pricei,t = β0 + β1(Workshopi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β2(Tradingcardsi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β3(Achievementsi ∗ Agei,t)
+ β4(Workshopi,t ∗ Pla yerNumbersi,t)
+ β5Agei,t + β6Pla yerNumbersi,t + ui + εi,t
where i denotes a specific game, t a specific day, ui the
individual (fixed) effect of a game, and εi,t the residuals. To
cater for potential heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation, we
cluster Standard Errors on a game level in Model 3 and 4
(White, 1980, pp. 817). An alternative, which is not ex-
plored in the scope of this paper, is to use a model based on
Baltagi (1999) who proposes a Fixed Effects Regression with
Autoregression Type 1 Disturbance, suitable for large time
dimensions.
6. Estimation Results
Table 2 and Table 3 at the end of this chapter provide a
condensed overview of our results. Full reports are found in
the Appendix. We present the results in order of our hypothe-
ses.
H1a argued that games that include the possibility of
User Generated Content via Workshop are priced at a higher
level. We test this at two distinct timepoints: Model 1 looks
at the price at release, while Model 2 looks at the price at
present (March 2020). Our results show that games includ-
ing Workshop demonstrate an on average 17% significantly
higher release price and an on average 16% significantly
higher present price, offering consistent support for H1a. We
also found support for H1b in Model 3. Specifically, games
with Workshop have on average 0.2% less price decline every
month compared to games without (see Figure 7).
Lastly, in Model 4 we found a significant positive inter-
action between Player Numbers and Workshop, showing that
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Figure 7: Price Development depending on Workshop Feature (95% CIs)
the effect of Player Number on price changes when the game
includes Workshop, thus offering support for H1c (see Figure
9).
H2a argued that games that include the possibility of col-
lecting and trading virtual items in Form of Tradingcards are
priced at a higher level. Again, we tested this at release
(Model 1) and present (Model 2). Contrary to our expecta-
tions, the feature Tradingcards exhibits a significantly nega-
tive effect on both the release price and present price. Games
with Tradingcards have a on average 27% lower release price
and 33% lower present price, leading us to reject H2a. Fi-
nally, we find with Model 3 that games with Tradingcards are
subject to a greater price decline over time than games with-
out (see Figure 10), which leads us to the reject H2b. Specifi-
cally, games with Tradingcards show an average of 0.3% more
price decline every month compared to games without.
H3a argued that games that include the possibility of
completing in-game challenges and earning social status via
Achievements are priced at a higher level. We find a positive
but, at the 5% level, just insignificant effect on release price
(Model 1). However, the feature demonstrates a positive sig-
nificant effect on present price, i.e. games with Achievements
have a on average 12% higher present price (Model 2). This
implies that H1c is only supported at an advanced life-cycle
stage of a game. H3b is confirmed (Model 3), as we see less
price decline with age for games with the feature (see Fig-
ure 11). Specifically, Achievements games show an average
of 0.23% less price decline every month.
Beyond our Hypotheses, we also estimated the effect of
Player Numbers on price and assumed that it changes over
the life-cycle of a game, by interacting it with Age. We found
that Player Numbers is negatively associated with price over
most of a game’s lifetime (Figure 13). In the Limitations (see
Chapter 7), we will address this fact critically.
Finally, we conducted robustness checks on all models.
For Model 1 and 2 by firstly taking up a reduced number of
variables and secondly extending them with variables that
represent less tangible user-defined characteristics about a
game such as “Diffcult”, “Classic” or “Family Friendly” (see
Appendix Table A6, Table A7). For Model 3 and 4 we took
up a reduced number of Variables (see Appendix Table A8).
All checks show consistent results.
A condensed summary of previously discussed results is
found in Table 2 and Table 3.
7. Discussion and Limitations
7.1. Discussion
In H1 we argued that developers who allow User Gen-
erated Content by including Workshop functionality can (a)
charge higher prices compared to other games and (b) de-
lay the natural price decline of their game. In essence, we
justified this by the fact that players value the possibility to
customize a game with their own and peers’ content and
thus keeping it engaging and stimulating in the long run.
We wanted to know whether this higher perceived value can
be exploited by developers in the form of higher prices. We
tested H1a at two distinct time points: at release (Model 1),
representing purely the developers perception of value, and
at present (Model 2), representing a shared belief about the
game, as players have been able to provide price feedback
through either buying or not. We found consistent support
for H1a by observing a higher price both at release (Model 1)
and present (Model 2). Additionally, we found H1b, i.e. less
price decline over time, confirmed, indicating that User Gen-
erated Content continually rejuvenates the game as it tech-
nically ages (see Figure 7). The support for H1c additionally
shows that Workshop functionality provides users with net-
work utility via indirect network effects. The effect of Work-
shop increases when a game has a larger player community,
most likely as each player has more peer-content to integrate
(see Figure 9).
In H2 we argued that developers who allow players to
collect and trade virtual items in form of Tradingcards can
(a) charge higher prices compared to other games and (b)
delay the natural price decline of their game. Essentially,
we hypothesized that players derive, amongst others, sen-
timental, monetary and social (e.g. status) value that de-
velopers exploit through higher prices. To our surprise, we
found Tradingcard games have a lower price level, both at
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Figure 8: Price by Players dep. on Workshop
Figure 9: Effect of Players dep. on Workshop
Figure 10: Price Development depending on Tradingcards Feature (95% CIs)
release and present. Additionally, they are also associated
with a stronger price decline (see Figure 10). These finding
are in sharp contrast to our theory and previous literature.
Therefore, we venture another look at the mechanics of the
feature to identify potential oddities that change the way the
feature works in the context of Steam. We discovered that in
the past, most recently in November 2019, Steam has banned
large numbers of games that, as they explain vaguely, were
“abusing Steam tools for financial gain” (PC Gamer, 2019).
Through further research we found Reddit threads and an old
Steam statement suggesting that some developers released
low-cost games with Tradingcards functionality to distribute
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Figure 11: Price Development depending on Achievements Feature (95% CIs)
Figure 12: Price by Players for different Age
Figure 13: Effect of Players dep. on Age
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Table 2: Effect of Community Features on Price Level
Model 1 2
IndependentVariable Price Release (log) Price Present (log)
Workshop 0.16∗∗ (0.05) 0.15∗∗ (0.06)
Tradingcards -0.32∗∗∗ (0.04) -0.40∗∗∗ (0.05)
Achievements 0.09 (0.04) 0.12∗ (0.05)
N 2,029 1,763
Adj.R2 0.66 0.68
Note: Full report see Appendix Table A6, Table A7. Robust SE in parentheses. ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.5.
Table 3: Effect of Community Features on Price Development
Model 3 4
IndependentVariable Price (log) Price (log)
Age -0.005∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Age∗Workshop 0.002∗ (0.001) 0.003∗∗ (0.001)
Age∗Tradingcards -0.003∗∗∗ (0.001) -0.004∗∗∗ (0.001)
Age∗Achievements 0.002∗∗ (0.001) 0.003∗∗ (0.001)





Note: Full report Appendix Table A8. Robust SE clustered on Game-level in parentheses. Age in Month, PlayerNumbers in
log. ∗∗∗p<0.001, ∗∗p<0.01, ∗p<0.5.
cards en masse to players or bots, and then profit from each
trade through fees on their cards (Reddit, 2019; Steam Blog,
2017). A closer look at our sample confirms that in Novem-
ber a disproportionate amount or games that retired or, as
we now know, were banned had Tradingcards as their only
feature (see Figure 14). While this fact has compromised the
expected effect of Tradingcards in our analysis, it does shed
light on the importance of designing robust incentive systems
when developing Community Features.
In H3, we argued that developers who allow players to
complete in-game challenges and thereby earn social sta-
tus via Achievements can (a) charge higher prices compared
to other games and (b) delay the natural price decline of
their game. At its core we justified this logic by assum-
ing increased perceived value through serving intrinsic needs
such as joy, feelings progression and accomplishment (see
also goal-setting theory and reinforcement-theory) on the
one hand, and extrinsic needs such as signaling competency
and building social status on the other hand. In terms of
H3a, we did not find significantly higher prices at the time of
release, but at present. This discrepancy may indicate that
developers, when setting the release price, initially underes-
timate the value that players gain from such functionality. A
different explanation may be that developers also consider
the amount of effort required to integrate certain functional-
ities. In contrast to Workshop, Achievements are very easy to
integrate by defining a few simple challenges for the player.
Lastly, we found H3b, i.e. less price decline over time, con-
firmed, indicating that challenges offer long-term value to the
game (see Figure 11). This makes sense, since especially the
extrinsic value (social status) that players derive from collect-
ing Achievements is independent of game age, hence players
are still interested in games at later life stages.
7.2. Limitations
First, in this study we investigate the influence of com-
munity features on pricing of games. It is based on the logic
that ceteris paribus increased utility is expressed in increased
willingness to pay, which developers capture through higher
prices. The validity of this rationale is based on two assump-
tions. First, that the market is largely efficient, since only
then will the equilibrium price reflect both supply and de-
mand (aggregated willingness to pay). Although we show
that digital gaming platforms share many elements of per-
fect markets (see Chapter 3: Industry Background), we are
aware that no real-world market is perfect. Secondly, price
is not only a measure of value but also a marketing tool.
Thus, it is conceivable that developers may pursue penetra-
tion strategies via initial discounts or even pursue alterna-
tive monetization models. We control as much as possible
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Figure 14: Distribution of Retired Games in Sample differentiated by Features
for such strategies by using, for example, the base price of a
game, which ignores strategic short-term discounts and only
reflects long-term price changes (see Figure 3). In addition,
we control as much as possible for complementary moneti-
zation strategies, such as additional paid content (DLCs) or
In-App-Purchases. Free games are completely excluded. De-
spite these measures, it is inevitable that unobserved strate-
gies impact pricing.
Second, we looked at a very concrete setting, which lim-
its the generalizability of our results. Community Involve-
ment is a critical success factor for the longevity of products
in the PC video game market. However, the success factor
“Community” may be less important for other digital plat-
forms, where content consumption involves less interaction
with other consumers or producers, such as music and video
streaming platforms. Furthermore, long content lifecycles
are not of the same relevance for all digital platforms. For
news platforms, for example, speed is key while fixed cost
are comparably low. Additionally, we also have to be careful
about generalizing among PC video games, as we restricted
our analysis to the most popular games on Steam due to data
quality.
Third, we initially tested the assumptions of Random Ef-
fects (see Chapter 5: Model Specification) to be able to esti-
mate the effect of time-invariant game features more easily,
however, had to proceed with Fixed Effects. We solved this
problem by interacting such variables with time-variant vari-
ables to still be able to make statements about price devel-
opment. Still, it would be worth testing for Random Effects
with adapted model specifications (e.g. excluding/including
variables) or look into Mixed Models (UCLA, 2020).
Forth, we found that the Player Number is negatively asso-
ciated with price (Model 3). We acknowledge that price and
Player Numbers may influence each other. When prices are
low, for example when discounts are offered, more players
are attracted. We identified two solutions to find out more
about the causal relationship. First, we could include an in-
strument variable that has high correlation with Player Num-
bers and low correlation with price to perform a Two Stage
OLS. The number of Twitch Viewers for each game over time
could be suitable. Second, we could lag the variable Player
Numbers by one month, which gives us an indication of how
developers are monetizing a larger player base. In the scope
of this paper, we tested Model 3 again without the variable
Player Numbers to make sure the coefficients of the Commu-
nity Features were not biased.
Lastly, we have to interpret the results of Model 1 and 2
conservatively, as we do not use Fixed Effects, that absorb any
heterogeneity between games. Consequently, there might be
unobserved differences between games, e.g. team size or
budget, which we cannot account for despite many control
variables (omitted variable bias). It would therefore be in-
appropriate to speak of a clear causal effect of Community
Features on price, and more correctly to speak of associa-
tions. Additionally, the study assumes that theoretically ev-
ery game could equally integrate Community Features. How-
ever, it is possible that Community Features make less sense
for some games, perhaps in the case of story-driven single-
player games. At the same time, Community Features may be
particularly useful in the context of multiplayer games, which
may already have an active, self-sustaining player base, mak-
ing it inappropriate to attribute positive effects on price to
features alone. In reality, therefore, integration is not always
decided randomly, but depends on the nature of the game.
8. Conclusion, Implications and Future Research
8.1. Conclusion
In this paper, we set out to answer the question of how
Community Involvement influences the price setting of firms
on digital platforms. We addressed this question in the con-
text of the gaming platform Steam by looking at three novel
ways to promote player interaction and involvement. Specif-
ically, we investigated how pricing of games is influenced
by three Community Features that allow players to (1) cus-
tomize a game with own and peers’ game content via the
Workshop Feature, (2) collect and trade virtual items via the
Tradingcards Feature, (3) completing challenges and earning
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social status via the Achievements Feature. We showed that
games with Workshop or Achievements demonstrate a higher
price level, the latter only at a more advanced age, as well
as less price decline over time. Contrary to expectations,
we found games with Tradingcards to be lower priced and
to have stronger price decline, which we explained by the
“misuse” of the feature by game developers. With regard to
our research question, this predominantly suggest that game
developers can charge higher prices for games with Commu-
nity Features and secondly, that they can delay the natural
price decline of their game.
8.2. Implications
Our findings are relevant for game developers. First, they
should consider integrating Community Features as a means
of maintaining consumer utility and thus willingness to pay
in the long run. However, as discussed before (see Chapter
7: Limitations), Community Features do not fit all games -
e.g. a multiplayer game may benefit from them differently
than a single-player game. The assumption that the mere in-
tegration of these features allows to charge higher prices is
misguided. Rather, the nature of the game must be taken
into account. In the best case, a natural fit between game
mechanics and Community Features is already ensured at the
conception stage of the game. Secondly, developers who seek
a two-way relationship and in particular co-creation with the
consumer must be prepared for new time-consuming and
costly tasks. They need to respond to customer requests, in-
tegrate feedback, provide development tools, create guide-
lines and ensure compatibility of User Generated Content.
Therefore, it is important to consider the trade-off between
potentially higher revenue and increased costs of implement-
ing and maintaining Community Features.
Our findings are also important for platform owners.
First, we know that the economic success of platforms and
content producers is closely linked through revenue shar-
ing. Platforms should therefore think about helping their
complementors succeed by empowering them with powerful
Community Features that increase the consumer’s value. Sec-
ond, platforms often fight for complementors and consumers
according to the “Winner-Takes-It-All” principle. With at-
tractive Community Features, platforms could differentiate
themselves in competition with other platforms.
8.3. Future Research
Future research could help generalize our findings for the
PC video gaming industry. For example, the sample should be
increased and randomized to investigate if our findings apply
to games that are less popular. It would also be interesting to
investigate the effect of Community Features on the size of
the player base of a game over time. In light of growing pop-
ularity of alternative monetization strategies, such as recur-
ring revenue through Micro-Transactions, In-App-Purchases,
Subscriptions, DLCs, sustaining a loyal player base is essen-
tial. Relatedly, it would also be worth looking into the rising
phenomenon of free games and their strategies of attracting
and monetizing on players. Lastly, it is worth further dis-
secting the effect of Community Features in inherent utility
that’s derived regardless of how many others use the features
(e.g. customization through own User Generated Content)
and network utility that’s dependent on how many others use
the feature as well (e.g. integration of peers’ User Generated
Content).
More importantly, we encourage future research of Com-
munity Involvement in the context of other novel digital plat-
forms. It will be interesting to see if the new types of Com-
munity Involvement we investigated are equally effective in
case of media products like music, video and news that have
different life-cycles and communities and consumption be-
havior.
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